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Abstract 
 
Most studies examining the relationship between social cleavages and party system 
fragmentation maintain that higher levels of social diversity lead to greater party system 
fragmentation. However, most aggregate-level studies focus on one type of social cleavage: 
ethnic diversity. In order to develop a better understanding of how different cleavages impact 
electoral competition, this paper considers another type of social cleavage: religious diversity. 
Contrary to previous literature, higher levels of religious diversity provide incentives for 
cross-religious cooperation, which in turn reduces party system fragmentation. Using a cross-
national data set of elections from 1946-2011, the results show that, in contrast to most 
studies examining the effects of social cleavage diversity on the number of parties, higher 
religious diversity is associated with lower levels of party system fragmentation.  
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Based on the seminal work by Duverger (1963; see also Cox 1997), the standard 
explanation of the number of parties cross-nationally holds that social cleavages drive party 
system fragmentation, while electoral institutions limit the number of parties in more 
restrictive systems (e.g. single-member district plurality systems) and allow for greater party 
system fragmentation in more permissive systems (e.g. proportional representation).  In line 
with seminal research in the social cleavage tradition (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 
1970), this model assumes that—conditional on electoral system permissiveness—diversity 
produces more parties.  This model has been applied successively to a wide range of 
countries at both the national (e.g. Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; 
Coppedge 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994) and district (e.g. Geys 2006; Singer and 
Stephenson 2009) levels.   
Owing to measurement difficulties that arise when operationalizing social cleavages 
cross-nationally, most studies focus on only one type of cleavage diversity that is (relatively) 
easy to operationalize: ethnic diversity.  The use of ethnic diversity as a measure of total 
cleavage diversity has several obvious shortcomings.  The most obvious is that ethnicity is 
but one aspect of cleavage diversity.  Moreover, previous research has shown that the 
measure of cleavage diversity examined affects the conclusions we draw about the 
relationship between social cleavages and party system fragmentation (Stoll 2008).  It is 
possible the impact of some cleavages on party system fragmentation differs from the impact 
of other cleavages.   
This paper begins to address this lacuna in the literature by exploring the impact of 
religious diversity on the number of parties cross-nationally.  Although most research 
assumes the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation is 
positive, there is reason to believe that this relationship may actually be negative.  Due to 
resource constraints on religious leaders resulting from competition in the religious 
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marketplace, religious leaders in religiously diverse countries will seek to preserve scarce 
resources and enhance their influence on policy by cooperating with other cleavage groups to 
support parties representing shared interests.  Such cooperation ultimately reduces the 
fragmentation of the party system.  Incorporating the effects of religious diversity into the 
now-standard Duvergerian model used by previous studies to explain party system 
fragmentation and testing it using a large cross-national data set of elections from countries 
around the world, I find that religious diversity is associated with lower levels of party system 
fragmentation in restrictive electoral systems, producing increases in fragmentation only in 
the most permissive systems.   
In the next section, I explore the relationship between religious diversity and party 
system fragmentation in greater detail.  Following that, I outline the research design 
employed to test the argument before moving to a discussion of the results.  A final section 
concludes with thoughts for future research.   
The Relationship between Religious Diversity and Party System Fragmentation 
In their landmark study, Lipset and Rokkan (1967; see also Rokkan 1970) argued that 
modern party systems have their roots in the centuries-old conflicts that continue to structure 
societies in the present.  In addition to the two types of cleavages arising from the industrial 
revolution—the urban-rural and class cleavages—Lipset and Rokkan identified two types of 
religious cleavages arising from the national revolution.  One was a confessional cleavage 
pitting minority religious denominations in the periphery against the centralizing forces of 
established churches (as part of the larger cultural elite), while the other was a cleavage 
between the established churches and the developing nation-state, which sought to wrest 
control from religious authorities in order to establish its secular authority.  The resulting 
party contestation along religious lines shaped the development of competitive party systems 
to a considerable extent in many countries (Caramani 2004; Ertman 2009).   
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Following in this tradition, studies seeking to explain the number of parties cross-
nationally have assumed that greater cleavage diversity yields more fragmented party 
systems.  In nearly every instance, however, previous studies examining the determinants of 
party system fragmentation have only focused on ethnic diversity, due in part to convenience, 
though also due to difficulties in measuring all cleavages precisely from one context to 
another (Stoll 2008).  With only few exceptions (e.g. Madrid 2005), these studies show that 
various measures of ethnic diversity tend to be associated with more fragmented party 
systems, conditional on the proportionality of the electoral system (Amorim Neto and Cox 
1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Geys 2006; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Singer and 
Stephenson 2009).   
Those few studies that do include measures of religious cleavages do not focus on 
religion per se.  For instance, Powell (1982) examined the effect of Catholic minority 
populations on legislative party system fragmentation. Other studies find a positive 
relationship between social diversity and party system fragmentation (Lijphart 1999), though 
such effects may be non-monotonic and/or conditional on institutional factors (Potter 2014; 
Stoll 2013).  While this sort of attention to a broad group of cleavage variables—including 
religion—is a welcome development, assuming all cleavage diversity produces greater party 
system fragmentation may not be warranted.  It could be that the impact of religious diversity 
on the number of parties differs from the effects of other social cleavages.  For instance, in 
examining the robustness of the relationship between various measures of social diversity and 
party system fragmentation, previous research finds that variables measuring religious 
diversity have the “wrong” sign when compared to variables such as ethnic diversity (Stoll 
2008; see also Lowery et al. 2013).  Until now, studies have not asked whether these findings 
are genuine or mere aberrations from what we expect should be a positive relationship.   
There may be reason to expect a negative relationship between religious diversity and 
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party system fragmentation.  According to the supply-side theory of religiosity, the vitality of 
religious organizations and religious devotion are determined by the patterns of competition 
among religious actors (i.e. the supply-side of religion).  In markets (i.e. countries) where 
religious competition is regulated—whether through state subsidy for and/or sponsorship of 
particular religious organizations, or by legal restrictions on certain organizations/practices—
religious organizations face little competition for survival, which leads to low levels of 
religious devotion and diversity.  In markets where state support is absent, religious 
organizations must compete for adherents in order to survive.  This competition leads 
religious organizations to work harder to attract adherents than religious groups in 
uncompetitive markets, which in turn leads to greater religious diversity (Berger 1963; Finke 
and Stark 1988; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994).   
Whereas party system fragmentation in uncompetitive religious markets is restrained 
only by electoral systems and the other social cleavage structures, the competition for 
religious adherents characterizing competitive religious markets puts downward pressure on 
the number of viable parties.  Unlike the institutionalized positions of religious leaders 
belonging to state-supported organizations that do not need to compete for adherents in order 
to survive, the influence of religious leaders—whether direct over policy or merely to 
preserve their autonomy over religious issues (Jelen and Wilcox 2002: 317-319)—in 
competitive markets is not guaranteed, but rather determined by their market share (number 
of adherents).  Instead of each religious group forming its own party, competition creates 
incentives for religious leaders in religiously diverse markets to cooperate with those sharing 
similar policy concerns (including both the leaders of other religious organizations and those 
concerned with other cleavage-group issues) in order to increase their political influence on 
religious issues.  Similar to other types of organizations in competitive markets (e.g. van de 
Ven 1976), such cooperation also preserves scarce resources that are better served in 
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competition for adherents in the religious marketplace (Berger 1963; Miller 2002; Wagner 
1997).  As religious diversity increases, the incentives to cooperate increase as well, thereby 
reducing party system fragmentation.   
The reduction in party system fragmentation resulting from such cooperation can take 
one of two forms.  One is where religion becomes the dominant cleavage, as elections are 
turned into battles fought along confessional and/or religious-secular lines that rally support 
from other overlapping (as opposed to cross-cutting) cleavages; this, in turn, reinforces the 
primacy of religious cleavages (see Coleman 1956).  The other is when religious cleavages 
are disarticulated and incorporated within the prevailing partisan divides.  In these situations, 
religious leaders will seek to preserve their influence by finding ways in which confessional 
and/or religious-secular interests map onto existing issue dimensions (e.g. class, ethnic, etc.), 
and bargaining religious voters’ support for parties with similar interests in exchange for 
influence over issues of great import to religious voters (e.g. abortion, same-sex marriage, 
etc.).  Ultimately, the choice between these two strategies is made by elites, who articulate 
the cleavages that best serve their electoral and policy interests (Enyedi 2005; Przeworski and 
Sprague 1986; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).  Because religious issues—often distinct from 
“normal” issues (e.g. Smith and Tatalovich 2003; Studlar, Cagossi, and Duval 2013; Tribe 
1992), owing to the levels of conviction (e.g. Ryan 2014; see also Skikta 2010) and 
supernatural consequences for those involved (e.g. Grzymala-Busse 2012; Stark 1999; Stark 
and Finke 2000)—are so fundamental to religious adherents, religious leaders will prefer the 
second strategy when religious issues are not the prevailing partisan divides because 
cooperation increases the chances that they will be able to influence policies concerning 
religion.   
We can see several specific examples of this type of cooperation resulting from 
market pressures in previous literature.  For instance, the Catholic Church only began to 
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cooperate with and articulate the concerns of indigenous Mexicans—after years of ignoring 
their concerns—when the Church began to feel the threat to their position (religious and 
political) created by the increasing numbers converting to Protestant denominations (Trejo 
2009).  Catholic clergy also cooperated with opposition groups against authoritarian leaders 
in Latin American countries where they faced pressure from growing Protestant churches—
but not where any such pressure was absent (Gill 1994).  Elsewhere, religious elites whose 
positions are threatened by increasingly secular publics have subsumed confessional 
cleavages under religious-secular cleavages, as with the formation of Christian Democratic 
Appeal in the Netherlands (Lucardie and ten Napel 1994), and religious-secular realignments 
in the United States (Layman 2001) and Chile (Raymond and Feltch 2014).  One could even 
argue that the survival of Christian Democratic parties in an age of secularization has been 
achieved by compromise between religious and class/other cleavage groups (Duncan 2006; 
Elff and Rossteutscher 2011), which has been true of their entire postwar histories (Kalyvas 
1996; Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010).  Additionally, religious leaders in diverse societies 
competing along a dominant versus minority religious cleavage often seek to incorporate 
overlapping ethnic and/or class issues into their struggles—e.g. establishment Protestants of 
British descent versus disadvantaged Catholic minority ethnic groups in Australia (Bean 
1999) and Canada (Blais 2005).   
While religious elites in diverse societies do have the option to support parties 
contesting elections separately from parties representing other cleavages, this strategy will 
result in wasted resources and reduced influence over religious issues in all but the most 
permissive electoral systems.  If the electoral system is not sufficiently permissive to weaken 
oppositional forces by promoting a high degree of party system fragmentation among non-
religious (class, ethnic, etc.) parties, then it will be in the best interests of religious party 
leaders to cooperate with leaders representing other cleavage issues in order to preserve 
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resources and maximize policy influence.  As a result, we should only see a positive 
relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation in the most 
permissive electoral systems: it is only in these systems where party system fragmentation 
will be sufficient enough that religious-secular and/or confessional parties will have the 
ability to compete with non-religious parties and/or one another for influence over policies 
regarding religious issues.   
The products of these religious market forces can be seen more clearly by examining 
the case of New Zealand in comparative perspective.  Although relatively homogeneous in 
terms of ethnic diversity,1 New Zealand is religiously diverse, divided primarily among 
Protestant, Catholic, and secular lines, though with small-but-significant Hindu, Buddhist, 
and Muslim minorities as well (Vaccarino, Kavan, and Gendall 2011).  Despite its religious 
diversity, and despite its use of a mixed-member proportional electoral system since 1996, 
religious-based parties have not found much success in New Zealand: though many Christian 
Democratic parties have contested elections in New Zealand, few have won more than a 
handful of seats (Barker and McLeay 2000), with no such party winning any representation 
since the 2008 elections.  Instead, religious issues—to the extent that they feature in New 
Zealand politics—tend to map onto the class cleavage, with Protestant voters supporting the 
right-of-center National Party and Catholic and secular voters supporting the left-of-center 
Labour Party (e.g. Bean 1988; Medeiros and Noël 2013).  Interpreted through the framework 
presented above, religious elites (and voters) have operated primarily within the traditional 
bounds of the two-party National-Labour party system because religious parties would not 
and have not featured very prominently in New Zealand party politics.  If religious leaders 
were to compete for power primarily through an explicitly religious party, religious issues 
would not receive much expression.  As a result, party system fragmentation in New Zealand 
is much lower than one would expect given its level of religious diversity (assuming the 
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relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation was positive): in the 
six elections between 1996 and 2011 (all held under a mixed-member proportional electoral 
system), the effective number of electoral parties averaged just over 3.5.   
In comparison with another country of roughly similar social and institutional 
structures, Lithuania, the impact of religious diversity on New Zealand’s party system 
becomes more apparent.  Information regarding both countries’ electoral systems, as well as 
the effective numbers of ethnic groups, religious groups, and parties’ vote shares appears in 
Table 1.  Both countries award nearly equal parliamentary seat shares in the upper tier of 
their mixed-member proportional electoral systems.  As seen in Table 1, both countries are—
ethnically speaking—relatively homogeneous.  Where the two countries differ—and differ 
quite significantly—is in terms of their respective levels of religious diversity.  Unlike New 
Zealand, Lithuania is less religiously diverse, with Catholics comprising nearly 80 percent of 
the population; the next largest group is the non-religious, at just over six percent (Statistics 
Lithuania 2013).  In this context, parties from several major party families—including 
Christian Democratic parties—have competed successfully for votes (Bakke 2010; 
Ramonaité 2006).  As a result, party system fragmentation in Lithuania is far greater than in 
New Zealand: the average effective number of parties in elections since the end of 
Communism exceeds seven, as seen in Table 1.  Although not demonstrative, the clear 
difference in religious diversity between the two countries does at least suggest the possibility 
that religious diversity may be negatively associated with party system fragmentation.   
[Table 1 about here] 
When compared with the Netherlands—which is a country of relatively equal ethnic 
and religious diversity to that seen in New Zealand—it is the Netherlands’ much more 
fragmented party system that requires explanation (instead of the other way around).  As seen 
in Table 1, the average effective number of parties in the Netherlands from 1998-2010 
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(roughly corresponding to the same period examined in New Zealand) was 5.8.  Here, the 
disparity in party system fragmentation between the two countries may be due to a key 
difference between the two countries’ proportional electoral systems: district magnitude.  
While New Zealand’s mixed-member proportional electoral system elects half of the 
available seats in its proportional tier to compensate for disproportional seat shares awarded 
in the lower tier, the Netherlands elects all 150 members of the House of Representatives in a 
single nation-wide constituency using proportional representation.  Because of the interaction 
posited between district magnitude and social cleavages in Duvergerian models of party 
system fragmentation (e.g. Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Geys 2006; 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Singer and Stephenson 2009), it is possible that the number 
of parties in the Netherlands is greater than in New Zealand only because the Dutch electoral 
system is sufficiently permissive for religious diversity to sustain the higher levels of 
fragmentation seen in Table 1.  Interestingly, however, party system fragmentation is lower in 
the Netherlands than in Lithuania despite the former’s use of a highly proportional electoral 
system, suggesting the greater religious diversity in the Netherlands may explain the lower 
level of fragmentation there.   
Research Design 
The discussion above suggests that, contrary to previous expectations, the relationship 
between religious diversity and party system fragmentation may be negative.  In order to test 
this possibility, I examine a Duvergerian model of party system fragmentation incorporating 
the effects of social cleavages, electoral institutions, and the interaction of these two types of 
variables.  In order to contribute to the already well-established literature on this subject, I 
incorporate religious diversity into a widely used model that is consistent with Duverger’s 
argument (see e.g. Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova 1994).  This model takes the following form:  
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ENEP = β0 + β1Log(Ethnic Diversity) + β2LogM + β3Log(Ethnic Diversity) × LogM + 
β4Upper Tier + β5Log(Ethnic Diversity) × Upper Tier + β6Proximity + β7ENPRES + 
β8Proximity×ENPRES + ϵ 
The dependent variable, ENEP, is the effective number of parties in elections for the 
legislature (the lower house in the case of bicameral legislatures).2  ENEP is measured as 
1/∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where n is the number of parties and pi is the proportion of votes won by the ith 
party.3  Data for this variable are taken from the “Democratic Systems Around the World, 
1946-2011” data set collected by Bormann and Golder (2013).  Their data set includes all 
legislative elections between 1946 and 2011 from countries meeting minimal democratic 
criteria (namely, the criteria set out by Alvarez et al. 1996).4  Because this data set includes a 
vastly larger number of countries and elections than previous research looking at the 
relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation, the analysis below 
provides a more generalizable test of the impact of religious diversity.   
Ethnic Diversity is measured as the (logged) effective number of ethnic groups.  
Similar to ENEP, the effective number of ethnic groups is measured as 1/∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where ei is 
the proportion of the population belonging to the ith ethnic group.  I use this measure of ethnic 
diversity in order to follow the practice of Clark and Golder (2006), who calculate the 
effective number of ethnic groups using data from Fearon (2003).5  Because some research 
has documented nonlinearity in the relationship between ethnic diversity and party system 
fragmentation (Raymond 2015), I use the logged effective number of ethnic groups.   
This model includes two variables to capture the effects of electoral systems on party 
system fragmentation—LogM and Upper Tier—both of which are interacted with Ethnic 
Diversity.  Following the longstanding observation that party system fragmentation tends to 
be greater in districts with larger district magnitudes (Taagepera and Shugart 1989), this 
model includes a variable measuring the (logged) mean district magnitude (LogM).  Because 
Duverger’s (1963) hypothesis predicts that diverse social structures will produce multiparty 
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systems only if electoral systems are sufficiently permissive (and vice versa), an interaction 
between Ethnic Diversity and LogM is included.  To account for the fact that seats in some 
countries’ legislatures are awarded in multiple tiers (e.g. as a means to address distortion in 
the votes-seats ratio produced by the use of single-member districts, as in New Zealand), this 
model includes a variable measuring the percentage of seats in the lower house awarded in 
upper tiers (Upper Tier).  Recognizing the effect of this variable may be conditioned by 
Ethnic Diversity in ways similar to LogM, I include an interaction between Upper Tier and 
Ethnic Diversity.   
One concern with estimating the effects of electoral systems on party system 
fragmentation is the possibility the choice of electoral systems is endogenous (e.g. Boix 
1999; Colomer 2005; Leeman and Mares 2014).  The most relevant concern here is that 
electoral systems are determined by the social structure—that countries employing more 
proportional electoral systems do so because their social structures are more diverse (Lundell 
2010: 32-40; Rokkan 1970).  However, when looking at the differences in ethnic and 
religious diversity between countries with single-member districts and those with district 
magnitudes greater than one and/or upper tiers (using the sample of countries used in the 
regression analyses), it turns out that—contrary to most expectations (however, see Horowitz 
1985)—the most ethnically and religiously diverse countries are those with single-tier, single-
member district electoral systems (significantly so at the p < 0.001 level).  Although the data 
do not allow us to rule out the possibility that the choice of electoral system is determined by 
the fragmentation of the party system, if electoral system variables are endogenous, this 
would mean that any shared variance with religious diversity is attributed by the model to 
electoral system effects instead of religious diversity.  This biases religious diversity 
coefficients in favor of the null hypothesis—suggesting that any negative effect of religious 
diversity will be under-estimated (i.e. erring on the side of caution).   
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To capture the impact of presidential systems on legislative party systems, this model 
includes Proximity (the time between the legislative election and the most recent presidential 
election), ENPRES (the effective number of presidential candidates in the most recent 
election), and an interaction between the two.  Following the practice established by 
(Amorim Neto and Cox 1997), Proximity is measured as the time elapsed between 
presidential and legislative elections using a continuous scale ranging from zero (for midterm 
elections—as well as non-presidential systems) to one (legislative and presidential elections 
are held concurrently).  Data for this variable are taken in part from the “Democratic 
Elections Around the World, 1946-2000” data set collected by Golder (2005), with missing 
data collected by the author.  ENPRES is calculated as 1/∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where ci is the proportion of 
votes won by the ith candidate.  Data for this variable are taken from Bormann and Golder 
(2013).  The logic behind these variables is that the fragmentation of the presidential party 
system will increase legislative party system fragmentation, though primarily when 
presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently.   
To determine the relationship between religious diversity and party system 
fragmentation, I simply incorporate a variable measuring the effective number of religious 
groups into the model above.  To account for possible nonlinearity in the relationship 
between religious diversity and party system fragmentation similar to that observed with 
ethnic diversity, I use the logged functional form of religious diversity.  Additionally, because 
the received wisdom derived from Duverger suggests that the effects of religious diversity 
may be conditioned by properties of the electoral system in ways similar to other cleavage 
variables like ethnic diversity, I include interactions between religious diversity and both 
LogM and Upper Tier.  The revised model examined in the empirical analysis below takes the 
following form:  
ENEP = β0 + β1Log(Religious Diversity) + β2Log(Ethnic Diversity) + β3LogM + 
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β4Log(Religious Diversity) × LogM + β5Log(Ethnic Diversity) × LogM + β6Upper 
Tier + β7Log(Religious Diversity) × Upper Tier + β8Log(Ethnic Diversity) × Upper 
Tier + β9Proximity + β10ENPRES + β11Proximity × ENPRES + ϵ 
Because previous research has shown that the relationship between social diversity 
and the number of parties may depend on the measure used (Stoll 2008), I estimate three 
models, each using one of three different measures of religious diversity to determine the 
robustness of the findings using any one measure.  The first measure of religious diversity is 
taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003), who create their measure of religious diversity using 
data from the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.  A second variable uses religious 
fractionalization data from Alesina et al. (2003).  A third variable is created using data from 
the Pew Research Center (2014).  Because the raw data taken from this study did not 
disaggregate the percentage of Christians into separate denominations, I supplemented this 
data set with other data from Pew (2011) measuring the percentage of each country belonging 
to Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox traditions.6  Descriptive statistics for these and each of 
the other variables are presented in Table 2.   
[Table 2 about here] 
To estimate these models, I use ordinary least squares regression.  Because the 
Bormann and Golder (2013) data set includes multiple elections for some countries, which 
may lead to under-estimated standard errors, I use country-clustered standard errors.  I do so 
for three reasons.  First, this follows the practice of Clark and Golder (2006); by following 
their practice, the results presented here can be compared to those produced in their earlier 
study.  Second, while the data set used here includes multiple elections in some countries, 
time-series methods are generally considered inappropriate due to the irregular intervals 
between election periods both within and across countries.  Third, the estimates presented 
below are even more conservative than those using panel-corrected standard errors (in which 
the consecutive number of elections is treated as a unit of time), as well as models using 
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bootstrapped standard errors (see the results presented in Appendix 1 and 2, respectively).   
Results 
Parameter estimates for the three regression models are presented in Table 3.  While 
the interpretation of interaction effects necessitates caution—requiring that we interpret the 
effect of one variable in the interaction conditional on the other—some preliminary 
conclusions can be gleaned from Table 3.  When looking at the regression coefficients for 
each of the three religious diversity variables, which represent the relationship between 
religious diversity and party system fragmentation when LogM equals zero (i.e. countries 
where district magnitude equals one), we see that the coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant.7  It is worth noting that the interaction between religious diversity and 
Upper Tier is small and statistically insignificant, which indicates that upper tiers do not have 
much bearing on the underlying relationship between religious diversity and party system 
fragmentation.  This implies that, at least in single-member district systems, party system 
fragmentation decreases as religious diversity increases.  Additionally, the coefficients for the 
interaction between religious diversity and LogM in each model are positive, implying that 
party system fragmentation increases (or at least that the negative association between 
religious diversity and party system fragmentation weakens) as district magnitude increases.   
[Table 3 about here] 
The precise estimated impact of religious diversity can be seen more clearly in Figure 
1, which presents the relationships between religious diversity (using the Fearon and Laitin 
measure) and party system fragmentation at different levels of LogM: zero (i.e. single-
member districts), two (roughly corresponding to mean district magnitudes of 7.4) and four 
(roughly corresponding to mean district magnitudes of 54.6).8  This allows us to examine the 
conditional relationships between religious diversity and party system fragmentation, which 
in turn allows us to determine whether the negative relationship seen in single-member 
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districts holds in more permissive electoral systems.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
As the results presented in Figure 1 show, the negative relationship seen when looking 
at the coefficient associated with religious diversity is not limited solely to single-member 
district systems.  In fact, this negative relationship holds in many proportional electoral 
systems as well, as evidenced by the weak negative relationship in countries with mean 
district magnitudes of 7.4 (LogM = 2).  As represented by the predicted relationship when 
LogM equals four, it is only as we approach higher values of LogM that the relationship 
becomes positive and significantly different from the relatively flatter relationship seen at 
LogM values of two.  Given that relatively few countries have electoral systems this 
permissive (LogM values greater than 2.8 fall into the 90th percentile of countries in this 
sample), this suggests that the relationship between religious diversity and party system 
fragmentation is negative in all but the handful of countries with highly proportional electoral 
systems.   
In addition to the fact that the predicted relationship between religious diversity and 
party system fragmentation is negative in a large number of countries, the results in Figure 1 
demonstrate that the estimated impact of religious diversity on party system fragmentation is 
quite powerful.  Going from the lowest to the highest values of religious diversity in single-
member district countries (i.e. LogM = 0), ENEP decreases by effectively 1.7 parties.  While 
the discussion above shows that this relationship is tempered by the permissiveness of the 
electoral system, the results in Figure 1 demonstrate that not only is the relationship between 
religious diversity and the number of parties negative, but also that religious diversity has a 
significant constraining effect on the fragmentation of the party system.   
These findings are not due to the choice of religious diversity measure.  As can be 
seen in Figures 2 and 3—which present the conditional relationships between religious 
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diversity and party system fragmentation when using the Alesina et al. (2003) and Pew 
(2014) measures of religious diversity, respectively—the relationships presented in Figure 1 
are quite robust.  In both figures, the relationship between religious diversity and party 
system fragmentation is strongly negative in single-member district systems.  This 
relationship nearly flattens out in Figure 2 for those countries where LogM equals two.  While 
the relationship becomes positive in Figure 3 for those countries where LogM equals two, it is 
slightly positive at best.  As in Figure 1, the relationship between religious diversity and party 
system fragmentation in Figures 2 and 3 is clearly positive only in those countries with highly 
permissive electoral systems.   
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
Thus, the results presented here provide considerable support for the notion that the 
relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation is negative in all but 
the most permissive electoral systems.  In contrast to the overwhelming majority of the 
literature dealing with the impact of social cleavages on the development of party systems, 
the results presented in this section suggest that not all social cleavage diversity produces 
greater party system fragmentation.  Consistent with expectations derived from the supply-
side theory of religiosity, these results suggest that religious diversity leads to lower—not 
greater—party system fragmentation, regardless of the religious diversity measure used.   
Conclusion 
Most studies focusing on the development of party systems have assumed that greater 
cleavage diversity produces more fragmented party systems.  This presumes, however, that 
higher levels of diversity lead to greater party system fragmentation for each type of 
cleavage.  When testing this argument cross-nationally, however, most research has focused 
solely on one aspect of cleavage diversity: ethnicity.  With few exceptions, other cleavages 
like religion have been excluded from Duvergerian models of party system fragmentation.   
17 
 
Building on the work of others voicing similar concerns (e.g. Stoll 2008), this paper 
has shown that the neglect of other cleavages and the assumption that all cleavage diversity 
produces greater fragmentation merit re-examination.  Consistent with expectations derived 
from the supply-side theory of religiosity, the relationship seen here between religious 
diversity and party system fragmentation cross-nationally is negative—and robustly so—in a 
large number of countries.  While the relationship between religious diversity and party 
system fragmentation becomes positive in more proportional electoral systems, the fact 
remains that it is only in the most proportional electoral systems where greater levels of 
religious diversity produce more parties.  This stands in sharp contrast to the expectations of 
the literature.   
Despite the fact the relationships presented here are robust to different measures of 
religious diversity, this piece offers what is admittedly only a preliminary step toward a better 
understanding of the impact of social cleavages on the number of parties cross-nationally.  
Obviously, future research will need to continue to expand the focus beyond ethnic and 
religious cleavages.  Additionally, although this paper has advanced an argument as to why 
we might expect to see a negative relationship between religious diversity and party system 
fragmentation, this should not be the last word on this matter.  Even if the findings presented 
here are confirmed by future research, more work is needed to test whether key aspects of the 
argument presented here are valid, or whether other forces better explain the relationships 
observed here.  As part of this effort, the supply-side religiosity argument presented here 
should be subjected to scrutiny in other ways—for instance, testing the argument 
diachronically—and at different levels (e.g. at the district level rather than the national level).  
Additionally, more work studying how religious leaders cooperate with one another and with 
leaders from other cleavage groups as religious diversity increases and religious cleavages 
become entangled with other cleavages.  Future research on this matter should examine under 
18 
 
what conditions religious cleavages subsume other cleavages and under what conditions 
religious cleavages are subsumed in order to preserve religious leaders’ influence.   
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Table 1: An Illustration of the Impact of Religious Diversity on Party System 
Fragmentation 
 
          Country 
    New Zealand   Lithuania  Netherlands 
Variables    (1996-2011)  (1992-2008)  (1998-2010) 
Effective Number of           3.6         7.0         5.8 
Parties (average) 
Effective Number of           1.6         1.5         1.1 
Ethnic Groups 
Effective Number of           4.4         1.8         3.2 
Religious Groups 
Electoral System  Mixed-member  Mixed-member List proportional  
    proportional  proportional  representation 
District  
Magnitude            1            1          150 
% Elected in an Upper         43.3         49.6         N/A 
Tier (average) 
Data for the average effective number of parties are calculated from data included in Bormann and Golder 
(2013).  Information regarding each country’s electoral system and district magnitude is also taken from 
Bormann and Golder (2013).  Data for the effective number of ethnic groups are taken from Fearon (2003), 
while data for the effective number of religious groups are taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003).   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
     Mean    Minimum 
Variables   (Standard Deviation) (Maximum) 
ENEP     4.02        1.23 
               (1.96)      (17.37) 
Religious Diversity:   0.52        0.00 
Fearon and Laitin (logged)            (0.43)        (1.53) 
Religious Diversity:    0.64        0.00 
Alesina et al. (logged)             (0.50)       (1.74) 
Religious Diversity:    0.62        0.00 
Pew (logged)              (0.36)       (1.63) 
Ethnic Diversity:    0.51        0.00 
Fearon (logged)             (0.44)       (2.65) 
LogM     1.36        0.00 
               (1.32)       (6.11) 
Upper Tier    6.06        0.00 
              (13.55)      (87.08) 
Proximity    0.29        0.00 
               (0.41)       (1.00) 
ENPRES    1.27        0.00 
               (1.65)       (8.65) 
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Table 3: The Relationship between Religious Diversity and Party System 
Fragmentation (ENEP) 
 
               Model 
Independent Variables  1   2   3 
Religious Diversity           -1.11***   
(Fearon and Laitin)          (0.39) 
Religious Diversity              -1.06***  
(Alesina et al.)             (0.25) 
Religious Diversity                 -1.55*** 
(Pew)                  (0.42) 
Ethnic Diversity            0.84**           0.77**           0.69** 
            (0.31)          (0.30)          (0.30) 
LogM            -0.06          -0.20          -0.43* 
            (0.19)          (0.23)          (0.24) 
LogM × Religious            0.49***           0.52***            0.88***  
Diversity           (0.16)          (0.18)          (0.21) 
LogM × Ethnic            0.41*           0.46*           0.53**  
Diversity           (0.22)          (0.24)          (0.23) 
Upper Tier            0.03**           0.04**           0.05**  
            (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02) 
Upper Tier × Religious          -0.00          -0.00          -0.01  
Diversity           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.02) 
Upper Tier × Ethnic           -0.03          -0.04          -0.06*  
Diversity           (0.03)          (0.03)          (0.03) 
Proximity           -3.29***          -3.10***          -3.16***  
            (0.48)          (0.51)          (0.46) 
ENPRES            0.13           0.16           0.20  
            (0.13)          (0.12)          (0.13) 
Proximity × ENPRES           0.90***           0.84***           0.84***  
            (0.21)          (0.20)          (0.19) 
Constant            3.73***           3.93***           4.20*** 
            (0.39)          (0.36)          (0.48) 
R2              0.35           0.36           0.36 
n              747           740           740 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Entries are regression coefficients with robust standard 
errors clustered by country in parentheses.   
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Figure 1: The Predicted Relationships between Religious Diversity (using the Fearon 
and Laitin measure) and Party System Fragmentation at Different Levels of District 
Magnitude 
 
 
 
Notes: Black lines represent the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation (ENEP) 
when LogM = 0 (i.e. district magnitude is 1); gray lines represent the relationship between religious diversity 
and party system fragmentation when LogM = 2 (corresponding to mean district magnitudes of ~7.4); while 
lines in light gray represent the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation when 
LogM = 4 (corresponding to mean district magnitudes of ~ 54.6).  Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals.  
The religious diversity scale is back-transformed in order to show the nonlinearity of the relationship.   
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Figure 2: The Predicted Relationships between Religious Diversity (using the Alesina et 
al. measure) and Party System Fragmentation at Different Levels of District Magnitude 
 
 
Notes: Black lines represent the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation (ENEP) 
when LogM = 0 (i.e. district magnitude is 1); gray lines represent the relationship between religious diversity 
and party system fragmentation when LogM = 2 (corresponding to mean district magnitudes of ~7.4); while 
lines in light gray represent the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation when 
LogM = 4 (corresponding to mean district magnitudes of ~ 54.6).  Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals.  
The religious diversity scale is back-transformed in order to show the nonlinearity of the relationship.   
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Figure 3: The Predicted Relationships between Religious Diversity (using the Pew 
measure) and Party System Fragmentation at Different Levels of District Magnitude 
 
 
Notes: Black lines represent the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation (ENEP) 
when LogM = 0 (i.e. district magnitude is 1); gray lines represent the relationship between religious diversity 
and party system fragmentation when LogM = 2 (corresponding to mean district magnitudes of ~7.4); while 
lines in light gray represent the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation when 
LogM = 4 (corresponding to mean district magnitudes of ~ 54.6).  Dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals.  
The religious diversity scale is back-transformed in order to show the nonlinearity of the relationship.   
 
 
  
LogM=0
LogM=2
LogM=4
1
2
3
4
5
6
P
re
di
ct
ed
 P
ar
ty
 S
ys
te
m
 F
ra
gm
en
ta
tio
n 
(E
N
E
P
)
1 2 3 4 5
Religious Diversity (Pew)
33 
 
Appendix 1: Robustness Tests of the Relationship between Religious Diversity and 
Party System Fragmentation (ENEP)—Panel-Corrected Standard Errors 
 
               Model 
Independent Variables  4   5   6 
Religious Diversity           -1.11***   
(Fearon and Laitin)          (0.17) 
Religious Diversity              -1.06***  
(Alesina et al.)             (0.13) 
Religious Diversity                 -1.55*** 
(Pew)                  (0.22) 
Ethnic Diversity            0.84***           0.77***           0.69*** 
            (0.16)          (0.16)          (0.16) 
LogM            -0.06          -0.20          -0.43*** 
            (0.11)          (0.14)          (0.14) 
LogM × Religious            0.49***           0.52***            0.88***  
Diversity           (0.09)          (0.11)          (0.13) 
LogM × Ethnic            0.41***           0.46***           0.53***  
Diversity           (0.11)          (0.13)          (0.11) 
Upper Tier            0.03***           0.04***           0.05***  
            (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01) 
Upper Tier × Religious          -0.00          -0.00          -0.01  
Diversity           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01) 
Upper Tier × Ethnic           -0.03*          -0.04***          -0.06***  
Diversity           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02) 
Proximity           -3.29***          -3.10***          -3.16***  
            (0.32)          (0.30)          (0.30) 
ENPRES            0.13*           0.16**           0.20*** 
            (0.08)          (0.07)          (0.08) 
Proximity × ENPRES           0.90***           0.84***           0.84***  
            (0.14)          (0.13)          (0.13) 
Constant            3.73***           3.93***           4.20***  
            (0.19)          (0.19)          (0.21) 
R2              0.35           0.36           0.36 
n              747           740           740 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Entries are regression coefficients with panel-corrected 
standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.   
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Appendix 2: Robustness Tests of the Relationship between Religious Diversity and 
Party System Fragmentation (ENEP)—Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
 
               Model 
Independent Variables  7   8   9 
Religious Diversity           -1.11***   
(Fearon and Laitin)          (0.18) 
Religious Diversity              -1.06***  
(Alesina et al.)             (0.14) 
Religious Diversity                 -1.55*** 
(Pew)                  (0.25) 
Ethnic Diversity            0.84***           0.77**           0.69*** 
            (0.19)          (0.19)          (0.19) 
LogM            -0.06          -0.20          -0.43*** 
            (0.13)          (0.14)          (0.15) 
LogM × Religious            0.49***           0.52***            0.88***  
Diversity           (0.11)          (0.11)          (0.13) 
LogM × Ethnic            0.41***           0.46***           0.53***  
Diversity           (0.15)          (0.15)          (0.15) 
Upper Tier            0.03***           0.04***           0.05***  
            (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.02) 
Upper Tier × Religious          -0.00          -0.00          -0.01  
Diversity           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01) 
Upper Tier × Ethnic           -0.03          -0.04**          -0.06***  
Diversity           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02) 
Proximity           -3.29***          -3.10***          -3.16***  
            (0.37)          (0.36)          (0.34) 
ENPRES            0.13*           0.16**           0.20*** 
            (0.08)          (0.07)          (0.08) 
Proximity × ENPRES           0.90***           0.84***           0.84***  
            (0.16)          (0.15)          (0.15) 
Constant            3.73***           3.93***           4.20***  
            (0.23)          (0.21)          (0.27) 
R2              0.35           0.36           0.36 
n              747           740           740 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.  Entries are regression coefficients with bootstrapped 
standard errors (10,000 replications) in parentheses.   
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1 Although New Zealand is home to a diverse number of ethnic groups, especially indigenous 
and other Pacific Islander groups, the number of people belonging to most groups is 
relatively small.  This produces relatively low levels of ethnic diversity when measured using 
variables like the effective number of ethnic groups, which takes into account not only the 
number of groups but also the percentage of people belonging to each group.   
2 While it would be interesting to examine the impact of religious diversity on the total 
number of parties contesting each election, results for every party contesting the election are 
not available in many countries.  Despite the absence of this information, ENEP remains an 
appropriate measure to test the argument outlined above because party system fragmentation 
reflects not only voters’ actions (are votes fragmented among several parties or concentrated 
on fewer parties?) but the degree to which elites either cooperate (resulting in less party 
system fragmentation) or contest elections independently (resulting in greater party system 
fragmentation).   
3 Because the reporting of results by some electoral agencies combining the results of several 
smaller parties into one “other” category can create uncertain estimates as to the actual 
effective number of parties, I follow the practice of Clark and Golder (2006) and use 
Taagepera’s (1997) correction to account for this uncertainty. However, the results presented 
here are substantively equivalent to those using the un-corrected measure of ENEP.   
4 Following the practice of Clark and Golder (2006), a number of countries were dropped 
from the analysis due to institutional peculiarities that potentially limited the ability to test a 
Duvergerian model.  Namely, countries were dropped if they used a fused vote system (where 
voters cast one vote that counts for both the presidency and the legislature) or a majoritarian 
upper tier (which renders these countries incomparable to those using upper tiers to achieve 
greater proportionality).   
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5 Although the models presented here all use Fearon’s (2003) measure of ethnic diversity, I 
substituted this measure with other measures of ethnic diversity—namely those produced by 
Alesina et al. (2003) and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009)—and found results that 
confirm those presented here.   
6 While tensions between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in some countries suggest that similar 
effort should be put into breaking down Muslim populations along Sunni and Shi’a lines, the 
Shi’a populations in the sample of countries used here were too small to have an impact of 
the construction of this variable.   
7 Multicollinearity among the independent variables was found to be quite low: variance 
inflation factor scores for all three religious diversity variables are below three (and variance 
inflation factor scores for all other variables are all below 10).   
8 I use LogM values of two and four primarily for illustrative purposes.  However, it is worth 
noting that LogM values of two represent the median value of LogM for all non-single-
member district systems in the sample.  Note also that this and the other two measures of 
religious diversity are well-distributed from low to high at each level of LogM.   
